Abstract. Blind signature schemes, an important cryptographic primitive, are useful in protocols that guarantee the anonymity of the participants. Two new blind signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem are presented.
Introduction
A blind signature scheme is a protocol allowing Bob to obtain a valid signature for a message m from a signer Alice without her seeing the message or its signature. If Alice sees m and its signature later, she can verify that the signature is genuine, but she is unable to link the message-signature pair to the particular instance of the signing protocol which has led to this pair.
The concept of a blind signature scheme was introduced by Chaum 2] . It allows to realize secure electronic payment systems protecting customer's privacy (e.g. 1], 3], 4], 5], 7], 10]) as well as other cryptographic protocols protecting the participants' anonymity (e.g. secure voting protocols 12]). Two proposals for blind signature schemes have been published: the rst, presented in 2], is based on the RSA scheme 11], and the second is described in 6].
In this article, we present two new blind signature schemes. The rst is derived from a variation of the DSA 8], the second is based on the NybergRueppel signature scheme 9].
2 Basic Signature Schemes 2.1 A Modi cation of DSA The system parameters consist of a prime p, a prime factor q of p ? 1, and an element g 2 Z p of order q. The signer's private key is a random element x 2 Z q , while the corresponding public key is y = g x (mod p). To sign a message m, which is an integer relatively prime to q, the signer selects randomly k 2 Z q , and computes R, r and s given by:
The pair (r; s) is the signature of the message m. To check its validity, the receiver computes T = (g s y ?r ) m ?1 (mod p) where m ?1 denotes the inverse of m modulo q, and veri es that the following equality holds: r = T (mod q):
Nyberg-Rueppel Scheme
The following signature scheme has been published in 9]. The system parameters are the same as in the previous scheme. To sign a message m 2 Z p , the signer selects k 2 Z q at random and computes r and s as follows:
The pair (r; s) is the signature of the message m. To verify the validity of a signature, one checks that the following equality holds: m = g ?s y r r (mod p):
Because this scheme provides message recovery, the signature need not to be accompanied by the message m.
Blind Signature Schemes
First we give a formal de nition of the blindness for a signature scheme. Let V denote Alice's complete view of an execution of the protocol, i.e. her random coin tosses and all exchanged values; and let (m; sig(m)) denote the messagesignature pair generated in that particular execution. 
Blinding the Modi cation of DSA
The following protocol is a blind version of the modi cation of DSA described in Section 2.1. 
